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WEBSTER,  N.y.  14580 

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CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHM/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


'anadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  /  Institut  Canadian  de  rnicroreproductions  historiques 


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Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes/Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


The( 
to  th 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best 
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the  usual  method  of  filming,  are  checked  below. 


□    Coloured  covers/ 
Couverture  de  couleur 


I — I    Covers  damaged/ 


D 


a 


a 


n 


n 


Couverture  endommagde 


Covers  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Couverture  restaur^e  et/ou  pellicul^e 


□    Cover  title  missing/ 
Le  ti 


titre  de  couverture  manque 


I      I    Coloured  maps/ 


Cartes  gtographiques  en  couleur 


Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)/ 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleue  ou  noire) 


□    Coloured  plates  and/or  illustrations/ 
Planc^  as  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 

□    Boun( 
Reli« 


Bound  with  other  material/ 
avec  d'autres  documents 


Tight  binding  {pay  causa  shadows  or  distortion 
along  interior  itiargin/ 

La  re  liure  serree  peut  causer  de  I'ombre  om  de  ta 
distorsion  le  long  de  la  marge  Int6rieure 

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modification  dans  la  m^thode  normale  de  filmage 
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Pages  de  couleur 

Pages  damaged/ 
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Thai 
poss 
of  th 
film! 


Origi 
begii 
the  I 
sion, 
othe 
first 
sion, 
or  ill 


n 


The 
shall 
TINl 
whic 

Map 
diffe 
entii 
begi 
righi 
requ 
metl 


Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata 
slips,  tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to 
ensure  the  best  possible  image/ 
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Ce  document  est  filmii  au  taux  de  rMuction  indique  ci-dessous. 

10X  UX  18X  22X 


26X 


30X 


1 


r 


12X 


16X 


20X 


24X 


28X 


32X 


The  copy  filmed  here  has  been  reproduced  thanks 
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gdnArosit*  de: 

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Canadian  History  Department 

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plus  grand  soin,  compte  tenu  de  la  condition  et 
de  la  nettet6  de  l'exemplaire  filmi,  et  en 
conformity  avec  les  conditions  du  contrat  de 
filmage. 


Original  copies  in  printed  paper  covers  are  filmed 
beginning  with  the  front  cover  and  ending  on 
the  last  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, or  the  back  cover  when  appropriate.  All 
other  original  copies  are  filmed  beginning  on  the 
first  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, and  ending  on  the  last  page  with  a  printed 
or  illustrated  impression. 


The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 
shall  contain  the  symbol  — »►  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  V  (meaning  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 

Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  are  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


Les  exemplaires  originaux  dont  la  couverture  en 
papier  est  imprimis  sont  film6s  en  commen^ant 
par  le  premier  plat  et  en  terminant  soit  par  la 
dernidre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustretion.  soit  par  le  second 
plat,  selon  le  cas.  Tous  las  autres  exemplaires 
originaux  sont  film6s  en  commenpant  par  la 
premidre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration  et  en  terminant  par 
la  dernidre  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 

Un  des  symboles  suivants  apparaitra  sur  la 
dernidre  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  selon  le 
cas:  ie  symbols  -^  signifie  "A  SUIVRE",  le 
symbols  V  signifie  "FIN". 

Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvant  dtre 
film6s  d  des  taux  de  reduction  diffirents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  dtre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  cliche,  il  est  filmd  A  partir 
de  Tangle  supdrieur  gauche,  de  gauche  d  droite, 
et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  ndcessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  mdthode. 


1 

2 

3 

1  2  3 

4.5  6 


^ 


?  "2.^1,  2  \^o 


^•=0-=,ci.-v^ 


MR.  PICKERING'S  SPEECH 


IN  THE  L 

SENATE  OF   THE  UNITED   STATES, 

ON  THE 

HESOL UTIOJ\r  OFFERED  B  Y  MR.  HILLHO  USE 

TO 

REPEAL  THE  SEVERAL  ACTS  LAYING  AN  EMBARGO, 
NOVEMBER  30,  1808, 


Mr.  PRESIDEtiTj 

THE  ample  discussion  already  given  to  the  resolution  ou 
your  table,  leaves  me  nothing  to  detail  on  the  efects^  produced  by 
the  embargo,  in  regard  to  France,  to  England,  or  ourselves.  On 
the  two  great  belligerents,  firactical  men,  who  knew  the  characters 
and  resources  of  those  nations,  foresaw  and  pronounced,  that  it 
•would  make  no  imfiression.  This  we  all  now  know  to  be  the  fact : 
while  we  ourselves  severely  feel  its  pressure.  Why,  then,  not 
remove  it  ?  Because,  as  we  are  told,  those  two  nations  have  violated 
our  neutral  maritime  rights  ;  and  seeing,  that  to  compel  their  re- 
spect for  these,  we  imposed  the  embargo,  and  they  treat  the  mea- 
sure with  comtempt ;  to  remove  it  would  be  submission.  So  we 
will  endeavour  to  conceal  our  mortification  ;  and  because  we  can- 
not injure  (Hem,  we  will  continue  to  punish  ourselves.  1  o  renew-* 
our  commerce,  while  their  decrees  and  orders  remain  uncancelled, 
would,  we  are  told,  be  "  abject  and  degrading  submission :"  and 
that  we  have  but  this  alternative,  "  to  make  war  with  both  nations," 
or  "  continue  and  enlprce  the  present  suspension  of  commerce." 

It  has  been  justly  remarked,  by  the  gentleman  from  Connecticut* 
[Mr.  Hihhouse]  that  to  run  away,  and  abandon  our  rights,  is  abject 
and  degrading. 

To  make  war  on  Jboth  the  belligerents,  i&  the  most  strange, 
quixotic  idea  that  ever  entered  into  the  head  of  a  statesman.    I 


■ 


s 


riuppose,  na  \rt  have  a  thousand  and  a  thousand  limes  declared,  that 
we  have  maintained  an  impartial  neutrality  towards  those  nations, 
so,  to  verify  our  declarations,  we  must  now  make  war  upon  bothi 
ijn/iartially  !  And  as  their  injuries  are  said  to  be  equal,  or,  we  will 
not  inquire  which  has  done  us  '^  the  most  harm  :"  so  we  must 
■measure  out  to  each  an  equal  quantity  of  resentment,  and  give  to 
each  an  equal  nunibyr  of  blows  I 

In  respect  to  our  violated  rights,  so  far  as  Great  iJritain  is  con- 
cerned, those  presented  by  the  administration  in  the  front  of  our 
claims,  arfe 

I.  An  exemption  from  impressment  of  all  seamen  on  board  our 
merchant  vessels. 

II.  A  free  trade  with  the  colonies  of  her  enemies. 

III.  An  exemption  from  capture  of  our  vessels  destined  for  any 
port  of  her  enemies  not  actually  blockaded. 

I  am  aware,  sir,  of  the  consequences  of  advancing  any  thing  from 
which  conclusions  may  be  drawn  adverse  to  the  opinions  of  our 
own  administration,  which  by  many  are  conceived  to  be  indisputa- 
bly just.  Merely  to  state  these  questions,  and  to  mention  such 
arguments  as  the  British  government  may  perhaps  have  urged  in 
their  support,  on  her  side,  i^  sufficient  to  subject  a  man  to  the  popu- 
lar charge  of  being  under  British  influence,  or  to  the  vulgar  slander 
of  being  a  '^  Briti&h  tory  :"  he  will  be  fortunate  to  escape  the  accu- 
sation of  touching  "British  gold.  But,  r,  none  of  these  things 
move  me  The  patrons  of  the  miscreantb  who  utter  these  slanders^ 
know  better :  but  are  nevertheless  willing  to  benefit  by  the  inipres- 
fiion  they  may  make  on  the  ininds  of  the  people.  From  an  early 
period  of  my  life,  I  was  zealously  engaged  in  every  measure 
Opposed  to  the  attempts  of  Great  Britain  to  encroach  upon  our 
Tights,  until  the  commencement  of  our  revolutionary  war;  and 
duriiig  its  whole  continuance,  I  was  Uninterruptedly  employed  in 
important  civil  or  military  departments  ;  contributing  all  my  efforts 
to  bring  that  war  to  a  succ<fslul  termination 

I,  sir,  am  not  the  adv<3cate  of  wrong  doers,  to  whatever  coL'ntry 
they  belong  ;  whether  cmperortj  or  kingis,  or  the  administrators  of 
of  a  republic.  J  us  tick  is  my  object,  and  truth  my  guide  }  and 
Aviierever  shk  points  the  S^ay^  I  ^hali  not  fear  to  go. 

Great  Britain  has  done  us  many  wrongs,  When  we  were  colo- 
nies, she  attempted  to  deprive  us  of  some  of  our  dearest  birth-rights ; 
Fights  derived  from  our  English  ancestors  ;  rights  which  we  de- 
fended and  finally  established  by  the  successful  conclusion  of  the 
revolutionary  wat.  But  these  wrongs,  and  all  the  wounds  of  war, 
wfere  intended  to  be  obliterated  and  healed  by  the  treaty  of  peace) 
when  all  entnities  should  have  ceased.  ;    f 

:  Great  Britain  wronged  us  in  the  capture  and  condemnation  of 
our  vessels  under  her  orders  of  1793  :  and  she  has  made  reparation 
for  these  wrongs'j  piirsuant  to  a  ti*eat  J''  negotiated  on  practical  prin- 
Vinles-  hv  a  statesrrtan   who.  with  Itlwral  -vitwn  tit\{\  rtal  candour% 

bought  adjustment  and  reparation. 


red,  that 
:  nations, 
)on  bothi 
,  we  will 
we  must 
d  give  to 

n  is  con- 
t)t  of  our 

loard  our 


d  for  any 

ling  from 
IS  of  our 
ndisputa- 
:ion  such 
urged  in 
he  popu- 
r  slander 
the  accu- 
se things 
;  slanders 
B  inipres- 
an  early 
measure 
upon  our 
i\ar ;  and 
>loyed  in 
ny  efFortB 

'  coL'ntry 
trators  of 
ide  \  &nd 

'ere  colo- 
;h-rigbts ; 
h  we  de- 
»n  of  the 
s  of  war, 
of  peace, 

nation  of 

e  pa  ration 

ucai  prin- 

caiidour% 


At  subsequetit  periods  she  has  committed  other  wrongs :  and  if 
reparation  had  been  demanded  in  the  same  spirit  of  candour  and 
firmness  which  were  manifested  in  1794,  that  distinguished  prece- 
dent authorizes  the  opinion,  that  a  like  equitable  adjustment  and 
reparation  might  have  been  obtained.  But  after  a  four  years  nego- 
tiation, in  which  volumes  of  essays  and  letters  have  been  written, 
it  has,  like  the  seven  years  negotiation  with  Spain,  been  brought  (in 
the  language  of  the  president  "  to  an  issue  of  some  sort :"  that  is, 
every  subject  of  dispute  remains  as  far,  probably  farther  from  ad- 
iustment,  than  when  the  negotiations  were  begun. 

It  is  this  disastrous  issue  which  now  enters  mto  our  deliberations. 
According  to  the  statements  of  the  administration,  we  are  brought 
into  a  situation  from  which  we  cannot  advance  without  war,  nor  re- 
treat without  dishonor.  Their  negotiations  with  France  have  also 
terminated  in  mortification  and  defeat. 

On  the  two  questions  of  the  impressment  of  seamen  on  board  our 
merchant  vessels,  and  a  trade  with  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain 
prohibited  m  time  of  peace,  the  gentleman  from  Maryland,  [Mr. 
Smith]  was  pleased  to  read  some  parts  of  a  letter  written  by  me  last 
winter  to  the  governor  of  Massachusetts,  to  be  laid  before  the  legis- 
lature :  and  on  the  latter  (neutral  trade)  he  also  read  the  journal  of 
the  senate,  which  exhibited  a  unanimous  vote  declaratory  of  our 
right  to  that  trade  ;  and  then  the  names  of  the  senators  (mine  being 
one  who  voted  to  request  the  president  to  demand  and  msist  on  re- 
paration for  the  injuries  done  us  in  violation  of  that  right ;  and  for 
thia  fiur/iose  to  enter  into  amicable  arrangements  ivttA  the  British 

government.  .        ,  ,  ,       , 

On  these  two  questions,  I  should  add  nothing  to  the  observations 
made  yesterday  by  the  gentleman  from  Connecticut,  but  for  the  ap- 
parent intention  of  the  gentleman  from  Maryland,  to  exhibit  an  in- 
consistency between  my  votes  in  the  senate  and  the  observations  of 
my  letter  on  the  same  subject.  .^   , , 

It  is  sufficient  for  me  to  remark,  that  in  the  passages  recited  by 
the  eentleman  from  my  letter,  my  object  was  to  shew,  by  exhibit- 
inff  in  a  few  words,  to  the  view  of  my  immediate  constituents,  and 
through  them  to  the  people  of  Massachusetts,  some  of  the  reasons 
which  might  have  inlluenced  Great  Britain  not  to  relinquish  her 
ancient  usage  of  impressing  her  oit>n  seamen  ;  nor  to  consent  that 
neutral  vessels  should  carry  on  (as  we  and  other  neutrals  were  car- 
rvintt  on)  the  whole  trade  between  the  countries  of  her  enemies  in 
Europe  and  their  colonies  ;  to  show,  I  say,  that  as  much  was  to  be 
said  on  both  sides,  those  rights,  as  claimed  by  the  United  States, 
were  not  to  be  considered  so  clear  and  indisputable  as  to  justify  a 
war  Kvith  Great  Rritain ;  into  which  the  proceedings  of  the  execu- 
tive,  in  a  variety  of  ways,  seemed  calculated  to  plunge  us. 

Before  I  quit  this  Bubject,  I  will  make  one  more  observation.  It 
appears  to  be  generally  supposed  that  the  rule  respecting  the  colo- 
Jal  trade  adopted  by  Great  Britain,  and  usually  called  the  rule  of 


« 


1736,  which  it  seems  she  has  considered  as  "the  ancient  and  estab- 
lished principle  of  maritinf>e  law,"*  was  peculiar  to  (Ireat  Britain  : 
and  Mr.  Madison  says,  "  it  is  well  known  that  Great  Britain  is  the 
only  nation  that  has  acted  upon,  or  otherwise  given  a  sanction  to 
it."t  fie  also  mentions  this  rule  as  having  been  introduced,  for 
the  first  time,  in  the  war  of  1756  ;  as  having  been  in  operation  on- 
ly a  few  years  in  that  war  ;  and  not  afterwards  acted  upon  until 
1793.  \     Let  us  examine  the  subject. 

In  Valin's  celebrated  work  on  maritime  law  (a  book  in  the  secre- 
tary of  state's  office.'  is  a  regulation  of  Louis  the  fourteenth,  in 
1704,  from  which  I  will  recite  some  passages. 

The  title  of  the  regulation  is  remarkable  :  it  is  "  concerning 
prizes  made  at  sea,  to  necure  the  navv^ation  of  neutral  statc^  and 
allies  during  war  ;"  implying  that  this  regulation  was  intended  to 
abate  the  rigor  of  maritime  law  b'^fore  that  time  practise^  towards 
neutral  commerce. 

Aftor  observing  that  propositions  had  been  made  to  him  by  the 
deputies  of  the  council  of  commerce,  the  Frciich  king  expresses 
his  approbation  of  them,  "  seeing  he  finds  in  them  the  means  which 
he  has  always  sought  of  procuring  equally  the  advantages  of  the 
subjects  of  neutral  princes  and  French  cruizers."  He  adds,  "  The 
subjects  of  neutral  princes  will  thus  find  the  care  which  his  majes- 
ty has  taken  to  preserve  for  them  t/ie  same  extent  and  the  same  liber- 
ty of  commerce  which  theij  have  been  accustomed  to  enjoy  dunng 
peace." 

I  will  now  read  such  of  the  articles  of  this  French  regulation  as 
relate  to  the  question  under  examination. 

^''Article  I.  His  majesty  forbids  French  privateers  to  stop  or 
bring  into  the  ports  of  his  kingdom,  vessels  belonging  to  subjects 
of  neutral  princes,  going  from  the  ports  of  their  dominion,  and 
laden  on  account  of  the  owners  or  other  subjects  of  the  said  neutral 
princes,  with  merchandise  of  the  growth  or  manufacture  of  their 
own  country,  to  carry  the  same  directly  into  any  other  states  what- 
soever, even  those  with  which  his  majesty  is  at  war  ;  provided  ne- 
vertheless, that  ttiere  be  not  in  the  said  vessels  any  contraband 
goods. 

''''Article  1.  They  are  in  like  manner  forbidden  to  stop  vessels 
belonging  to  subjects  of  neutral  princes,  going  from  the  ports  of  any 
state  whatsoever,  even  of  those  with  which  his  majesty  is  at  war, 
and  laden  on  account  of  the  owners  or  other  subjects  of  the  said 
neutral  princes,  with  merchandise  which  they  shall  have  received 
in  the  same  country  or  state  whence  they  shall  have  departed,  to 
return  directly  into  the  ports  of  the  dominion  of  their  sovereign. 

'''-Article  3.  He  also  forbids  them  to  stop  vessels  belonging  to  the 
subjects  of  neutral  princes,  departing  from  the  ports  of  one  of  the 


*  Mr.  Madison's  letter  of  March  aj. 
I  Same  letter. 


l8o8,  to  Mr.  Erskinc, 
\  Idem. 


md  estab- 
t  Britain  : 
ain  ih  the 
uiction  lo 
luced,  for 
ration  on- 
ipon  until 

:he  secre- 
eenth,  in 

mcerning 
Uatfs  and 
tended  to 
rl  towards 

m  by  the 
expresses 
ms  which 
cs  of  the 
Is,  «  The 
lis  majes- 
ame  liber- 
oy  dunng 

ulation  as 

\  stop  or 
3  subj*ects 
nion,  and 
d  neutral 
z  of  their 
ites  what- 
vided  ne- 
jntraband 

)p  vessels 
rts  of  any 
s  at  war, 
the  said 
!  received 
parted,  to 
reign, 
ng  to  the 
)nc  of  the 


states  ncuti-al  ©r  allied  to  his  majesty,  to  go  into  another  state  alike 
neutral  or  allied  to  his  majesty  ;  provided  they  are  not  laden  with 
merchandise  of  the  growth  or  manulacture  of  his  enemies ;  in 
which  case  the  merchandise  shall  be  good  prize,  and  the  vessels 

shall  be  released.  ,         n    ,  • ,       •     »         ^     , 

".//rftV/f  4  In  like  manner  his  majesty  forbids  privateers  to  stop 
-vessels  belonging  to  subjects  of  neutral  princes  departing  from  a 
•state  allied  to  his  majesty  or  neutral,  to  go  to  a  state  the  enemy  of 
his  majesty  ;  provided  there  be  not  on  board  said  vessel  any  mer- 
chandise contraband,  nor  of  the  growth  or  manufacture  of  the  ene- 
mies of  his  majesty;  in  which  cases  the  merchandise  shall  be  good 
prize,  and  the  vessels  shall  be  released. 

^^Artide  6.  Vessels  belonging  to  subjects  of  neutral  states  which 
shall  depart  from  the  ports  of  a  state  the  enemy  of  his  majesty, 
and  there  have  taken  their  lading,  in  whole  or  in  part,  to  go  to  the 
states  of  any  other  prince  than  their  own,  whether  allied  to  his  ma- 
iestv,  neutral  or  enemy,  may  be  stopped  and  brought  into  his 
kingdom,  and  shall  be  declared  good  prize  with  their  ladmg,  even 
although  laden  on  account  of  the  subjects  of  his  majesty,  or  of  an 
allied  or  neutral  state."  „     ,    •       ., 

This  regulation  of  Louis  XIV.  in  1704  (he  beng  then  at  war 
■with  Eneland  and  Holland)  was  re-enacted  by  Louis  XV .  in  1744, 
(France  being  again  at  war  with  Er -land}  with  some  exceptions 
in  regard  to  those  neutral  nations  with  whom  h  ranee  had  formed 
treaty-stipulations  incompatible  with  that  regulation. 

In  these  five  articles  we  have,  if  I  mistake  not,  the  whole  doc- 
trine of  the  British  rule  cf  1756.  The  cZ/r^cf  trade  to  and  from 
neutral  ports  and  the  enemy's  ports,  being  permitted  ;  but  not  the 
ti-adeto  and  from  the  ports  of  one  allied  or  neutral  state,  to  and  from 
the  ports  of  another  allied  or  neutral  state  ;  if  ^i  lading  of  the  neu- 
tral vessels  consist  of  merchandise  the  firoducti^v  ^  of  he  enemy  s  coun- 
try  ;  much  less  to  carry  the  same  from  one  por»  of  the  enemy,  to 
another  port  of  the  enemy.  j    r.,     r.        u  i  *•  « 

The  PRINCIPLE  of  the  British  rule  and  of  the  French  regulation 
anoears  to  be,  to  prevent  new^ra/s  coming  in  to  aid  the  enemy  in  the 
commerce  of  one  part  of  his  dominions  with  any  other  part  thereof, 
or  in  procuring  a  market  for  the  enemy's  productions,  in  any  other 
country  than  that  of  the  neutral  actually  transporting  the  same,  and 
for  its  own  use  and  conswnfition. 

It  appears  moreover,  by  the  preamble  to  the  French  regulation, 
that  the  restrictions  on  neutral  commerce,  which  we  are  now  ex- 
amining, instead  of  commencing  in  1756,  were  m  exercise  by  the 
English  and  Dutch,  antecedent  to  that  regulation,  and  with  greater 
rigor ;  the  French  king  professing  to  ameliorate  the  condition  of 
neutral  commerce,  by  that  regulation.* 

•  But  Great  Britain  has  admitted  that  the  vessels  of  the  United  States  might 
carry  on  an  inJir.a  trade  from  the  European  dominions  of  her  enemies  to  tncr 
colonies,  and  from  those  colonies  to  their  parent  wuntrjc  m  Europe;  and  « both 


On  the  subject  of  blockade,  when  vesach  of  war  were  not  so  sta- 
tioned before  the  poi  t  declared  to  be  blockaded,  as  to  constitute 
what  is  called  an  actual  blockade,  undoubtedly  abuses  have  taken 
place. 

To  form  an  actual  blockade  of  a  port,  ships  destined  for  that  ob- 
ject must  l>e  "  sufliciently  near  to  |)roduce  an  evident  danger  in 
entering."  But  these  words  by  no  means  imply  a  certainty  of 
ca/iture^  by  the  blockading  ships,  of  the  vessel  so  attempting  to 
enter.  What  degree  of  risk  from  blockading  ships  will  amount 
to  a  lawful  blockade,  may  sometimes  be  a  disputable  question. 
Would  the  chance  of  capturing  three  vessels  out  of  four,  or  seven 
out  of  eight,  exhibit  such  un  ''  evident  danger  in  entering,"  as 
would  constitute  an  actual  blockade  ?  that  is,  when  to  insure  their 
entering  in  salety  would  be  worth  a  premium  of  from  75  to  90  per 
cent.     This  must  remam  a  question  of  some  difficulty  to  adjust. 

On  these  points,  sir,  and  all  others  in  dispute  with  Great  Bri- 
tain, my  opinion  remains  imchanged,  that  they  are  yet  proper  sub- 
jects of  negotiation,  to  be  undertaken  in  the  real  n/iirit  of  concili' 
atioJi  and  adjufitment.  That  the  embargo  will  not  induce  her  to 
yield  to  our  demands,  we  have  atnple  proof,  not  only  in  the  answer 
of  the  British  government  to  our  minister  in  London,  but  in  th6 
certain  ability  of  that  nation  and  her  colonies  to  supply  all  their 
own  wants.  That  she  j)ossesses  the  means,  I  think,  has  been  de» 
nionstrated  by  gentlemen  who  have  spoken  before  me.  We  have 
lieard  mu(  h  of  the  patriotism  and  patient  endurance  of  our  fellow 
.citizens,  under  the  distresses  of  the  embargo  ;  and  gentlemen 


cases,  the  trade  has  been  considered  indirect  when  carried  on  through  the  United 
States  :  that  is,  when  the  cargoes  ladtn  on  board  American  vessels,  n  the  ports 
of  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain,  have  been  first  imported  into  the  United  States, 
and  carried  thenct  in  the  same  or  other  American  vessels,  to  the  enemy  coun- 
tries, or  colonies  respectively  But  the  facts  which  should  constitute  an  indirect 
trade,  not  havinjj  been  definitively  declared  ;  on  the  contrary,  a  they  have  been 
several  times  varied,  either  by  the  orders  of  the  British  o;ovcrnnnent,  or  by  the 
decision  of  htr  courts  of  admiralty — much  vexation  and  injury  have  thencc-accru- 
cA  to  the  commerce  of  the  United  States. 

But  the  treaty  negotiated  by  the  president's  ministers,  (Messrs.  Monroe  and 
Pinkncy)  and  signed  by  them,  with  the  British  commissioners  on  the  ^^  1st  of 
December  1806,  comprehended  a  definitive  provision  on  this  head  Such  trade, 
between  the  parent  countries  and  colonies  of  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain,  was 
to  be  considered  indirect,  when  the  articles  of  the  growth,  protluce  or  manufac- 
ture of  Europe,  were  first  carried  to  the  United  States ;  and  on  re-exportation, 
remained  after  the  drawback,  subject  to  a  duty  of  one  per  cent,  on  their  valu^. 
In  like  maniier,  all  articles  of  the  growth  and  produce  of  the  enemy's  colonics, 
being  first  brought  to  the  United  States,  and  there  entered  and  landed,  and  on 
re-exportation  remaining  subject  to  a  duty  of  two  per  cent,  on  their  value,  might 
be  re-laden,  and  freely  exported  to  any  country  in  Europe.  The  duties  in  both 
cases,  to  be  paid  into  the  treasury  of  the  United  States 

This  arrangement  was  calculated  to  prevent  any  further  dispute  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  about  the  trade  between  the  countries  of  her 
enemies  in  Europe  aiid  their  colonies      But  the  prc$idei)t  thought  fit  to  reject  thr« 
,ti-«utj,  withojut  laying  it  before  the  sCQ»te. 


lot  so  sta« 
constitute 
mvc  taken 

)!'  that  ob- 
langvT  in 
'tuhuy  of 
npting  to 
1  amount 
question. 
,  or  seven 
ring,"  as 
sure  their 
to  90  per 
adjust, 
ireat  Bri- 
•oper  sub- 
of  concili' 
e  her  to 
le  answer 
)ut  in  th6 
all  their 
been  de- 
We  have 
ur  fellow 
entlemen 

the  United 
n  the  ports 
lited  States, 
icmy  coun- 
;  an  indirect 
'  have  been 
,  or  by  the 
encc-accru- 

lonroe  and 
he  31st  of 
Such  trade, 
ritain,  was 
r  maiiurac- 
xportatioii, 
heir  valu^. 
'3  colonics, 
ed,  and  on 
lue,  might 
cs  in  both 

■twcen  the 

ries  of  her 

reject  thre 


apealc  confidently,  that  this  patience  will  hold  out  till  Great  Tritaiu 
shall  be  brought  to  our  feet.     At  the  same  time,  they  calculate  on 
the  distresses,  which  they  fondly  imagine  the  eniLai<;o  will  inflict 
on  the  people  of  (ireat  liritain  and  her  colonies,  to  excite  discon- 
tents and  insurrections  sulTiciently  alarming  to  induce  that  govern- 
ment to  abandon  usages  on  which  she  relies  to  maintain  her  mart- 
time  ascendency,  and,  at  this  time,  her  independence  as  a  nation. 
But  why  should  it  be  supposed  that  the  people  of  Great  Britain 
will  ije  less  patient  under  sutlerings,  than  the  people  of  the  United 
State?  ?    Their's   would  arise  from  causes  beyond  their  control  ; 
oUr's  from  some  cause  or  causes  operating  on  our  ruLi-ra,  but  which 
the  /K'o/.'/r  can  neither  see  nor  understand.     Within    four  months 
alter  the  embargo  was  imposed,  the  president  himself,  by  procla- 
mation, announced  to  us  and  to  the  world  the  existence  of  one  in- 
surrection, occasioned  by  the  embargo  ;  and  the  provisions  made- 
in  the  supplementary  acts,  to  compel  obedience  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet,  shew  how  appiehensive  the  governn>ent  were  of  discon- 
tents and  resistance.     These  extraordinary  provisions  for  the  ex- 
ecution of  a  filuci/lc  mraxurt  demonstrate,  that  it  was  considered  as 
ofifioaed  to  the  gc7u-ral  ■'icme  of  the  fieolde  ;  and,  in  a  free  country, 
such  a  measure  cannot  long  be  carried  into  execution.     The  votes 
of  approbation  of  the  embargo  by  public  bodies,  and  other  assem- 
blies of  citizens,  so  ostentatiously  displayed,  while  they  manifest 
the  force  of  fiariy,  are,  to  say  the  least,  but  equivocal  indications  ot 
the  "general  sense  of  the  people,  or  even  of  the  individuals  compos- 
ing those   assemblies.     Those  votes  have  always  had  fewer  AfurW 

XhiiCivo'icra.  ■»,       ,       ,  •         ,     , 

Mr.  President,   the  gentleman  from  Maryland  mentioned  the 
extreme  danger  to   which   our   commerce    would   be    exposed, 
while  the  French  decrees  and  British  orders  remain  unrepealed.  It 
has  been  often  said,  and  perhaps  oftener  insinuated,  in  newspapers 
and  pamphlets,  that  if  our  vessels  were  permitted  to  go  to  sea, 
all  would  he  taken.     What  escaped  the  French,  would  be  cap- 
tured by  the  English  ;    and  what  escaped  the  latter,  would  fall  a 
prey  to  the   former.       There   is  a  want  of  truth   in   all   this. 
The  same  gentleman  quoted  a  statement  made  by  an  eminent  mer- 
chant of  Massachusetts,  that  of  eight  or  ten  vessels  which  sailed 
about  the   time  the  embargo  was  laid,  one  only  had  reached  the 
place  of  her  destination.     1  remember  seeing  a  statement  of  that 
sort ;  and  I  think,  also,  that  I  saw  a  detection  of  its  fallacy.     If  they 
had  not  reached  their  destined  ports,  it  did  not  follow  that  they 
were  captured  and  condemned. 

The  same  merchant  has  expressed  his  decided  opmion,  "  that, 
ivotwithstanding  the  French  decrees  and  British  orders  in  council, 
if  our  embargo  was  off  we  should  haye  more  trade  than  would  be 
enjoyed  by  us,  if  all  the  world  were  at  peace,  and  the  respective  na- 
tions should  monoDolize  as  much  of  their  own  commerce  as 
usual."  Another  eminent  merchant  expressed,  at  the  same  time., 
the  same  opinion. 


mm 


But  without  resting  the  question  on  o/iinionx,  Ave  muy  appeal  t» 
J'acts.     I  have  sought  information  of  the  risks  whicli  liave  attended 
our  foreign  trade,  within  the  present  year,  from  the  two  principal 
districts  of  Massachusetts. 

By  the  statement  in  my  hand,  lately  received,  and  which  is  of  un* 
questionable  authority,  I  find,  that  at  one  insurance  ofiice  in  Bos- 
ton, 43  policies  have  been  written,  on  vessels  engaged  in  foreign 
voyages,  since  the  first  of  January,  lb08.     Of  these 

5  were  undetermined. 

1  vessel  (the  Neutrality)  bound  fiom  Marseilles  to  Boston,  cap- 
tured and  condemned  at  (iibraltar,  for  violating  the  blockade 
declared  by  the  British  orders  in  council. 

37  arrived  safely.     In  all  4.3. 

It  is  stated,  that  there  were  three  policies  on  the  Neutrality  ;  and 
that  possibly  there  might  be  more  than  one  policy  on  one  vessel 
among  the  37  sale  arrivals. 

At  another  ollice  in  Boston,  out  of  75  risks,  principally  to  the 
West  Indies, 

3  vessels  were  captured  by  the  French,  of  which  the  British  re- 
captured  2. 

1  captured  by  the  British,  supposed  to  be  French  property. 
16... .about  this  number  are  undetermined  ;  and  the  rest,  about 
55,  have  ended  safely.     In  all  75. 

At  another  office  in  Boston,  out  of  somewhat  more  than  lOi 
risks, 

4  vessels  were  captured  by  the  British,  of  which  2  were  con- 
demned for  breach  of  orders  in  council  ;  1  probably  enemy's 
property,  and  1  remained  under  adjudication. 

1  captured  and  condemned  by  the  l''rcnch  ;  and 
.  1  seized  by  them  at  Alicant,  while  they  had  the  power  there. 

25  risks  were  undetermined  ;  and  the  remamder  ended  safely. 

Tiie  premiums  of  insurance  ha\e  bden  about  eleven  percent,  to 
and  iVom  the  West  Indies,  for  the  whole  voyage. 

7  per  cent,  from  the  West  Indies,  with  cargo  on  board. 

9  to  K'  percent,  from  Europe,  if  not  violating  British  orders. 

4  to  5  per  cent,  from  Europe,  against  French  capture  only. 

By  a  statement  received  from  Salem,  on  the  correctness  of 
Avhich  1  can  rely,  I  find  that  in  the  district  of  Salem  and  Beverly, 
22  vessels  sailed,  by  the  president's  permission,  between  the  5th 
of  April  and  the  10th  of  August.  Of  these  vessels,  one  sailed  to 
Sumatra,  one  to  Senegal,  and  the  rest  to  the  different  ports  in  the 
West  Indies.     Of  the  v.hole  number, 

1  returned  leaky,  and  remained  at  home. 

12  rLturned  in  safety  ;  and 

9  reiiuiir.ed  undetermined  ;  but  it  was  not  known  that  any  of 
them  had  been  detained  or  condemned  by  any  foreign  power. 
In  all  22. 

Tlie  iii=ur;mce  on  the  Sumatra  voyage,  cut  and  home,  w'as  14 
per  cent. 


'appeal  t* 
re  littciulftl 
>  principal 

;h  is  of  un* 
ice  in  Bos- 
in  foreign 


oston,  cap- 
e  blockade 


•ality ;  and 
one  vessel 

11  y  to  the 

British  rc- 

5erty. 
>t,  about 

than   109 

■vvere  con- 
f  enemy's 


Lherc. 
1  safely, 
er  cent,  to 

d. 

orders, 
inly. 

jctness  of 
i  Beverly, 
en  the  5th 
e  sailed  to 
rts  in  the 


at  any  of 
gn  power. 

e,  was  14 


Martinico,  *) 
Huvanna,  > 
Surinam,  J 


The  voyage  out  and  home,  9  to  10  per  cent. 


Huvatnia,  at  and  from,  5  \  per  cent. 
The  premium  of  insurance  from  Calcutta  to  the  United  States, 
the  hist  summer  and  autumn,  has  been  8  per  cent. 

Thus,  Mr.  President,  we  see  that  the  risk  on  our  foreign  trade 
has  been  very  little  increased  since  the  issuing  of  the  Fr<'ich  decree 
of  Berhn,  and  the  British  orders  in  council. 

i'he  gentlc.i.au  from  Maryland  [Mr.  Smith]  asks— -What  would 
have  been  the  insurance  on  an  American  vessel  bound  to  1- vance  . 
1  am  not  informed.  Perhaps  75  to  90  per  cent,  though  it  is  not 
probable  tliat  our  merchants  would  hazard  their  vessels  on  such  a 
voyage,  or  that  the  underwriters  would  insure  them.  But  what 
docs  this  prove  ?  Why,  tliat  the  risk,  under  the  British  orders,  is 
so  great,  in  attempting  to  enter  a  port  in  France,  as  perhaps  to 
amount  to  un  actual  blockade. 

I  now  beg  leave,  sir,  to  communicate  the  information  I  have 
recently  received  from  the  latter  of  the  two  merchants  before  re- 
ferred to*.  Having  requested  of  him  the  data  on  which  his  opinion 
before  mentioned  was  founded,  he  has  sent  me  an  answer  (dated 
the  23d  instant^  from  which  I  will  read  the  material  parts. 

He  says,  ''  respecting  the  comparative  trade  of  profound  peace, 
.vnd  ihe  present  moment,  if  the  embargo  should  be  removed,  and 
the  decrees  and  orders  of  council  remain,  it  is  a  subject  about 
which  It  is  difficult  to  go  into  that  detail  which  will  show  satisfac- 
torily an  exact  result :  because,  if  you  resort  to  the  exports  of  a 
year  in  time  of  profound  peace,  and  compare  the  aggregate  with 
a  year  in  war,  the  prices  being    so  different,    the  difference  in 
amount  will  not  give  the  exact  data  we  want.     And  to  take  the 
(luuntity  of  each  article  of  export  will  not  be  satisfactory  ;  because 
in  different  years  we  export  more  of  the  same  article  to  the  same 
market,  and  in  proportion  to  the  increased  quantity  raised,  or  the 
goodness  or  badness  of  the  crop.     But  of  the  fact  I  have  no  doubt, 
that  onr  trade  would  be  much  greater  and  more  productive,  if  the 
embargo  were  removed,  than  it  can  be  in  time  of  peace  :  because 
when  the  colonial  trade  of  the  European  powers  is  confined  as 
usual,  we  cannot  carry  any  kind  of  provisions  to  the  colonies  of 
any  of  them,  without  being  subject  to  a  heavy  duty,  nearly  equal 
to  a  pronibition.     And  we  are  not  allowed  to  bring  away  any  thmg 
but  rum  and  molasses  ;  and  of  course  we  lose  the  whole  of  the 
colonial  trade,  so  far  as  respects  importing  any  articles  with  a  vie\f 
of  exporting  them  again  ;  excepting  only  from  the  Isle  of  France, 
ancV  Bourbon,  which  has  generally  been  fiee.     But  we  may  be  shut 
out  there.     The  trade  to  the  colonies  is  now  free  for  all  exports 
and  imports  with  small  duties.     And  if  the  largest  and  most  na- 
tural European  markets  for  the  sale  nf  cslonial  produce  are  Qcclud. 
ed,  still  we  have  open  to  us,  all  that  the  British  have,  and  we  can 
now  carry  those  articles  to  Sweden,  Spain,  Portugal,  Coast  of  Bar- 

•  Mr.  Thorndikc. 


'I 


w 

bary,  Turkey,  Sidly,  Sardinia  and  Malta  j  the  three  last  of  \vhid« 
are  ports  at  which  the  articles  sell  high,  and  are  bought  for  the 
purpose  of  smugj^ling  over  to  the  continent,  where  they  are  sent 
m  great  quantities. 

The  following  statement  is  then  given,  of  the  amount  of  our 
exports  from  the  30th  of  September,  1806,  to  September  30,  1807, 
(taken  from  the  report  of  the  secretary  of  the  treasury)  to  ooun- 
tries  and  places  other  thar.  those  in  Europe  which  are  under  the 
governmen:  or  controul,  or  in  alliance  with  the  French  emperor  ; 
all  which  are  considered  as  shut  up  by  the  Urirish  orders  of  council. 


Domestic  exports  (or  of  articles  of  the  growth,  } 
produce  or  manufacture  of  the  United  States},  ^ 
Foreign  goods  exported,        .... 


To  this  may  be  added  Spanish  dollars,  exported  to 
India  and  China,  and  which  are  not  noticed  in  the  re- 
.port  of  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  and  may  be  esti- 
mated at  least  at, 


S  36,109,991 
^4,  r  40,495 

60,230,480 


6,00C,000 


"^^  J>oIe  amoimt,         .  .  .  8  66,250,486 

«  This  amount  may  be  exported  without  being  subject  to  the 
British  orders  of  council :  and  the  extra  premiums  against  French 
ca/Huresy  would  not  exceed  the  following  rates,  vi :. 

To  Sweden,  2  per  cent — Swedish  and  other  West  Indies,  and 
the  Spanish  Main,  5  do.—Cape  of  Good  Hope,  4  do— England, 
Scotland,  without  the  Channel,  say  Liverpool,  Greenock,  Ireland, 
&c  Sec.  4  do.— And  within  the  Channel,  6  do.— Guern^jv,  Jersey, 
&c.  5  do.— Gibraltar,  3  do.— Spanish  ports  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay, 
6  do.— Spanish  ports  on  the  Atlanlic,  3  do— Spanish  ports  on 
the  Mediterranean,  5  do.— Madeira,  the  Canaries,  Fayal,  and 
other  Azores,  3  do— Portugal,  3  do.— Cape  de  Verd,   3  do.— 

Sicily,    5    do — Mwlta,  6  do.— China,    4  do Sumatra,   3  do  — 

Spanish  and  Portuguese  America,  3  do— Calcutta,  and  the  Coast 
oi  Coromandel  and  Malabar,  5  do— Africa,  4  do— Arabia,  and 
Ked  Sea,  including  Mocha,  and  Muscat,  4  do.— xManilla,  4  do  — 
North  West  Coast  of  America,  2  do.— Halifax  and  Newfound- 
land, 1  do. 

"  In  time  of  profound  peace,  our  trade  might  be  fairly  estimatea 
thus:— 

Domestic  exfwrts.       Foreiifn  exfiorta 
■  ,  .  ,  48,699,392  Nothing. 

To  which  may  be  added  spe-  ?  In  time  of  peace  these 

cie  to  China  and  India,      J    ^>""">0^0  J 


S  54,699,592 


must  be  so  very  in- 
considerable  as  to  be 
unimportant  in  this 
.  .  statement. 

^   This  IS  supposing  the  same  domestic  articles  as  were  exported 

m  1806,  and  anowinp-  them  to  be  at  th 

comparison  stands  thus 


a9t  of  whidi 
ight  for  the 
ley  are  sent 

ount  of  our 
er  30,  1 807, 
y) to  coun- 
e  under  the 
1  emperor ; 
s  of  council. 

,  36,109,991 

^4, 1 40,495 

60,250,480 


6,00C,00« 

66,250,486 
bjcct  to  the 
linst  French 

Indies,  and 
— England, 
)ck,  Ireland, 
^  jy,  Jersey, 
T  of  IJiscay, 
li  ports  on 
Fayal,  and 
•d,  3  do. — 
•a,  3  do. — 
d  the  Coast 
\rabia,  and 
lla,  4  do. — 
Newfound- 

"f  estimated 

n  exfiorta 
hing. 

peace  these 
50  very  in- 
ile  us  to  be 
tiu    in  this 


%  66,250,486 


54,699,592 


["e  exported 


30  that 


11 


Our  exports,  if  the  embargo  were  removed, 

would  be         •         •         •         '   -    *    ,    n  •*•  *u 
Free  from  any  embarrassment  from  the  British 

drders  in  council.  ,    ,      r- 

If  peace  were  to  take  place,  and  the  Lu- 
vopean  nations  assume  their  trade  as  usual ; 
and  the  prices  of  our  domestic  n  nicies  remain 
as  the  average  prices  in  1806,  (which  they 
would  not)  we  should  export,         .         .        •  

I-eaving  §11,550,894 
less  export  trade  in  time  of  peace  than  we  might  now  enjoy ;, 
and  which  amount  is  to  be  twice  water-borne,  once  in  importing  it 
from  the  places  of  growth,  and  again  in  carrying  it  to  the  con- 
sumers:  and  of  course  would  employ  shipping  appertaining  to  the 
carriage  of  one  freight,  equal  in  amount  to  more  than  twenty-threc 
millions,  one  hundred  thousand  dollars. 

'•  As  an  evidence  of  the  correctness  of  this  statement,  it  wili  be 
seen,  by  a  recurrence  to  the  statement  of  the  secretary  of  the  trea- 
sury for  the  year  1803,  that  the  exports  had  fallen,  in  that  short 
Peace,  from  S  93,020,5  13,  to  S  55,800,033.      ^  ,    .    c     ^u 

«  It  is  to  be  observed,  that  we  might  now  enjoy  a  trade  to  bouth 
America  and  the  Spanish  Main,  which  might  be  estimated,  at  least, 
at  from  four  to  five  millions  of  dollars,  a  considerable  part  of  which 
would  be  again  exported  to  Spain  and  Portugal,  and  wh.cn  has 
never  made  any  part  of  the  secretary's  report;  because  the  trade 
to  those  countries  has  been  prohibited  until  lately.  It  may  also  be 
remembered,  that  the  export  trade  does  not  show  the  whole  ad- 
vantage  of  the  colonial  trade  which  we  might  now  enjoy  ;  because 
all  we  import  for  our  own  consumption  ought  to  be  added. 

FHere  Mr.  Lloyd  slated,  that  in  his  opinion  the  value  ot  the  trade 
which  might  now  be  prosecuted  from  the  United  States,  consider- 
ing the  present  circumstances  of  the  great  nations  of  Lurope,  would 
be  as  extensive  as  could  be  carried  on  after  a  general  peace,  and  the 
adoption,  by  the  European  powers,  of  their  restrictive  colomal  sys- 

^^  On\his  clear  and  interesting  view  of  the  commerce  which  the 
United  States  might  carry  on,  were  the  ernbargo  out  of  the  way, 
no  comments  are  necessary.  The  observations  of  the  writer  of  the 
letter  are  evidences  of  his  being  master  of  the  subject.  ^ 

Mr.  President,  the  gentleman  from  Virginia,  [Mr.  Giles]  nas 
been  pleased  to  attribute  the  discontents,  in  New  England,  espec- 
ally  in  Massachusetts,  relative  to  the  embargo,  solely  to  the  arts 
of  rfm«§-o^'ues,  who  wish  to  get  into  office.  .     ,    .       •* 

The  gentleman  from  Connecticut  noticed  this  reproach  :  but  as  it 
appeared  to  be  levelled  chiefly  at  leading  citizens  in  Massachusetts, 
I  tUl  it  to  be  my  duty  further  to  remark,  that  ot  all  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  none  stand  more  aloof  from,  none  more 
detest  the  chAracter  oi  aeraugubuc^j  wi«"  w.o.^  \.^  ^x.^.i.  -i—  b- 


m 

tleman  referred.  I  know  tliose  men  who  reprobate  the  embargo, 
and  who,  in  convcrsat  on,  and  in  newspapers,  express  their  senti- 
ments about  it,  or  patronize  thoKe  who  do.  Thry  are  not  seekir.g 
for  offices  ;  many  of  them  could  not  be  persuaded  to  accept  the 
best  office  in  a  president's  gift ;  but  to  save  their  country  from  the 
effects  of  measures,  in  their  view,  ahke  ruinous  and  dist^raceful. 
They  are  men,  sir,  whose  age,  whose  experience,  whose  know- 
ledge, whose  wisdom,  whose  virtue,  place  them  in  the  first  rank 
of  citizens.  They  are  men,  sir,  ten  of  whom,  had  they  been  in 
Sodom,  would  have  saved  that  city  from  destruction  Among 
them  was  the  immortal  Amks,  than  whom  a  purer  sp  rit  never  left 
the  earth,  fie  wrote  while  he  had  strength  to  hold  a  pen  He 
died  on  the  anniversary  morning  of  the  nation's  birth -day— -and 
this  was  among  his  last  prayers  :    ()  !  Save  my  country  ! 

Gentlemen  have  said  much  about  insurrection  and  rebellion  ; 
and,  in  language  not  very  concdiatory,  pointe-  all  their  allu- 
sions to  the  people  of  New  Kngland.  Other  rulers  pronounced 
them  rebels,  more  than  thirty  years  ago  :  while  many  then  unborn 
now  wish  to  cover  themselves  with  their  mantle,  and  to  share  the 
honors  of  the  patriots  of  seventeen   hundred  and  seventy-six. 

But  why  should  gentlemen  be  surprised  that  great  discontmts 
prevail  in  that  country  ;  and  that  the  legislatures,  with  a  delibera- 
tion and  solemnity  which  should  command  attention,  have  pro- 
nounced their  opinions  of  the  embargo  ?  Gentlemen  will  recollect 
that  there  the  revolution  began,  of  which  Boston  was  the  cradle. 
And  if  they  will  turn  to  the  declaration  of  independence,  they  will 
find  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  colonies'  separating  themselves 
from  Great  Britain,  and  renouncing  the  government  of  the  king, 
was.  their  enacting  laws  ^'  for  cutting   off  our  tradk  with 

ALL   PARTS   OF   THK     WORLD." 

Mr.  President,  in  ^  public  document  on  our  tables,  we  are  told, 
that  "  after  a  period  of  twenty  five  years  of  peace,  hardlv  inter- 
rupted by  transient  hostilities,  and  of  prosperity  unparalleled  in  the 
history  of  nations,  the  United  States  are  for  the  first  time,  since 
the  treaty  which  terminated  the  revolutionary  war,  placed  in  a  si- 
tuation equally  difficult,  critical  and  dangerous." 

That  our  country  has  enjoyed  such  unexampled  prosperity,  I 
readily  agree  :  but  the  firencm  is  not  the  first  time  that  these  states 
have  been  placed  in  a  dijjicult,  critical^  and  dangerous  situation. 

'1  he  gentleman  from  Connecticut  yesterday  noticed  the  most 
difficult  crises.  In  l?^3,  it  ivquired  all  the  firmness  and  immense 
popularity  of  president  Washington,  to  s.em  the  torrent  of  popu- 
lar delusion,  that  was  hurrying  the  United  States  into  the  vortex  of 
the  French  revolution 

In  1794,  the  same  steadiness,  the  same  undeviating  pprsuit  of 
the  public  welfare,  in  spite  of  popular  clamor  and  formal  opposition, 
were  necessary  to  institute  a  mission  to  Great  Britain,  to  negotiate  and 
settle  with  that  government  questions  of  the  highest  moment  to  these 
states,  and  which,  if  they  remained  much  longer  unsettled,  might 
endanger  the  peace  of  the  nation.    That  negotiation,  committed 


13 


;  embargo, 
heir  senti- 
nt  seekiiig 
accept  the 
y  from  the 
isi^racel'ul. 
ose  know- 
first  rank 
ey  been  in 
Among 
t  never  left 
pen      He 
-day — and 

• 

rebellion  ; 
their  allu- 
ronounced 
leii  unborn 
>  share  the 
ty-six. 
discontmts 
a  delibera- 

have  pro- 
11  recollect 
the  cradle. 
,  they  will 
hemselves 

the  king, 
lDK  with 

e  are  told, 
dly  inter- 
:Ied  in  the 
me,  since 
cd  in  a  si- 

)sperity,  I 

lese  states 

tuation. 
the  most 
immense 

;  of  popu- 
vortex  of 

pprsuit  of 
pposition, 
^otiateand 
It  to  these 
ed,  might 
ommitted 


to  the  conduct  of  a  statesman,  than  whom  our  country  has  pvo- 
duccf!  not  one  more  firm,  more  wise,  or  more  upright,  was,  by  his 
canduL  ability  and  Ueckiiou,  tirought  to  a  happy  conclusion,  in  fi  wer 
mi'Ti'/m  inau  some  more  modern  negotiations  have  occupied  t/cara^ 
without  being  brought  to  any  conclusion  ;  unless  tlieir  ultery(«7i<rff 
may  be  called  a  conclu'ton. 

in  1795,  the  United  States  were  agitated  to  their  centre,  by  the 
opposition  to  the  Hritish  treaty.  Artful  and  aspiring  demagogues 
seized  upon  the  known  prejudices  of  the  people  in  regard  to  the 
two  great  contending  nations  ;  and  exerting  all  their  faculties  to 
keep  up  the  popular  delusion,  hoped  that,  by  the  loud  and  extend- 
ed clamot",  the  president  would  be  deterred  from  ratifying  the 
treaty  w  uc'i  \lv.  ay  had  so  happily  concluded.  Here  again  were 
displayed  the  firnuiess  and  patriotism  of  .\  ashington.  Always 
deterniincd  to  pursue  the  true  interests  of  the  people,  although  at 
the  hazard  of  his  popularity,  he  ratified  the  treaty.  Here,  it  was 
presumed,  all  opposition  would  cease.  But  it  again  appeared,  and 
with  a  more  formidable  aspect,  in  the  national  legislature.  But  I 
will  not  dwell  upon  it.  'Ihe  treaty  Avas  finally  carried  into  execu- 
tion.    It  had,  however,  one  more  enemy  to  encounter. 

Revolutionary  f  ranee,  wishing  to  involve  us  in  a  war  with  Great 
Britain,  which  this  treaty  (merely  of  amity  and  commerce)  had 
prevented,  /irctended  that  it  was  equivalent  to  a  treaty  of  al/ia7ice 
with  Great  Britain.  And  seizing  on  this  pretence,  fit  once  to  vent 
her  resentment,  and  gratify  the  rapacity  of  her  rulers  with  the 
plunder  of  our  citizens,  she  let  loose  her  cruizers  upon  our  com- 
merce. 

We  urged  the  obligations  of  treaties,  violated  by  these  captures. 
She  answered,  t/iat.  she  found  unly  a  real  disadvaritage  in  those  obli- 
gations I  and  continued  her  depredations.  Repeated  missions  of 
respectable  ministers  to  Paris  endeavored  to  propitiate  her  rulers, 
and  prevail  on  them  to  put  a  stop  to  such  enormities.  But  they  were 
deaf  to  the  voice  of  justice.  Then  it  was  that  our  government  au- 
thorized an  armed  commerce,  and  equipped  a  small  but  gallant 
navy  for  its  further  protection  ;  and  made  other  defensive  prepara- 
tions, such  as  have  been  stated  by  the  gentleman  frwm  Connecticut. 

If,  sir,  our  country  is  now  placed  in  a  situation  n\ore  ^*  difficult, 
critical  and  dangerous,"  than  at  any  of  the  periods  to  which  1  have 
adverted  (though  I  am  very  far  from  adopting  that  opinion,'  where 
shall  we  look  for  the  cause  ?  If  in  1794,  when  England  had  power- 
ful associates  in  her  war  with  France,  and  the  latter  had  been  com- 
paratively, but  little  extended  beyond  her  natural  limits ;  the  Unit- 
ed States,  with  perhaps  two-thirds  of  her  present  population,  and 
less  than  half  her  present  revenue,  were  able  to  induce  England  to 
accede  to  their  just  demands,  and  to  close  all  differences  by  an  ad- 
vantageous treaty  ;  how  has  it  happened  that  the  present  adminis- 
tration, with  all  the  accession  of  power  from  an  increased  popula- 
tion^  and  a  more  than  doubled  revenue  -  when-,  too^  "'{"'antic  France 
wielded  the  force  and  the  resources  of  continental  Europe  ;  and 
England,  single-handed,  was  lett  to  meet  a  world  in  arms ;  how 


14 


ii 


I 


I    ' 


'1  i 


iias  it  happened,  that  with  these  superior  advantages  and  mow 
powerful  means,  all  the  negotiations  of  the  present  administration 
with  England  (one  excepted  of  loca.'  rather  than  general  applica- 
tion, and  which  I  need  not  explain,  have  failed  ?  Had  they  been 
conducted  with  equal  candour,  ability  and  dignity,  must  they  not 
have  pioduced  as  early,  and  at  least  as  advantageous  results  ?  VVas 
this  a  cause  of  their  failure,  t/mt  points  of  qurMionablt  right ^  because 
not  settled  by  the  universally  acknowledged  law  of  nations,  and 
therffore  of  doubtful,  or  hopeless  attaifinutit,  were  pcrtinacioushj  in- 
aisled  on  ? 

Mr.  President — To  find  a  remedy  for  evils,  as  well  in  the  body  po- 
litic as  in  the  natural  body,  it  is  necessary  to  investigate  their  causes. 

Nearly  eight  years  have  elapsed  since  we  were  told,  by  the  high- 
est authority  in  the  nation,  that  under  the  auspices  of  the  federal 
governmtnt,  the  United  States  were  then  "  in  the  full  tide  of  suc- 
cessful experiment."  And  the  report  on  our  tables,  to  which  I  have 
before  alluded,  declares,  in  grave  and  solemn  language,  that  dur- 
ing a  period  of  five-and-twenty  years,  which  brings  us  down  to  the 
embargo,  the  United  States  have  enjoyed  a  "  prosperity  unexam- 
pled in  the  history  of  nations."  Yet  during  the  whole  of  this  period 
of  unequalled  prosperity,  arising  Jrom  the  active  fiursuits  of  com.' 
inerce  and  agriculture^  each  giving  life  and  vigor  to  the  other,  that 
commerce  has  been  exposed  to  the  aggressions  of  the  belligerent 
nations.  For  those  of  t.reat  Britain,  up  to  near  the  close  of  1794, 
compensation  was  made,  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  Mr  Jay's 
treaty.  For  the  like  aggressions  by  Spain,  the  like  indemnity  was 
p-iven  by  virtue  of  the  treaty  with  that  power,  concluded  in  Octo- 
i)er  1795.  For  French  spoliations  during  the  whole  period  of  her 
revolutionary  war  (spoliations  which  have  been  estimated  at  not 
less  than  millions  of  dollars)  we  have  received  nothing  !  Nor  ha^e 
Y/e  obtained  any  reimbursement  from  Spain  for  th6  siDbliations 
committed  by  her  cruizeis.  after  she  became  the  ally  of  Frdnve. 

Captures  and  condemnations,  however:  more' or  less  extended, 
have  never  ceased  :  notwithstanding  all  which,  and  the  continued 
impressment  of  seamen  from  our  merchant  vessels,  the  same  un- 
exampled prosperity  has  attended  us  ;  until  suddenly,  and  to  the 
astonishment  of  the  nation,  this  liovving  tide  of  successful  commerce 
and  agriculture,  was  stopped  by  that  fatal  measure,  the  embargo. 
The  shock  was  aggravated  by  the  concealment  of  its  real  cause. 
iSir,  I  hazard  nothing  in  asserting,  that  to  this  day  that  cauSe  hai 
fwt  been  satisfactorily  declared.  Allow  me  time  to  justify  this 
aesevtion.  I  will  bring  together  facts  and  circumstances,  and  then 
gentlemen  will  judge  whether  my  conclusion  be  erroneous  or  just. 

On  the  14th  of  December  1«07,  the  dispatches  brought  by  the 
Revenge,  from  cur  minister  in  Paris,  were  delivered  to  the  secre- 
tary of  state.  On  her  arrival  at  New  York,  reports  brought  by  her 
siated,  that  the  French  emperor  had  declared  that  there  should  be 
no  neutrals.  1  he  sources  of  information,  and  the  character  of  the 
smpivor,  rendered  those  reports  worthy  of  credit ;  and  though  aftei> 


15 


m1  mor«! 
list  rat  ion 
applica- 
hey  been 
they  not 
;s  ?   VVas 

1  because 
ons,  and 
ioushj  in» 

body  po- 
ir  causes, 
the  high- 

2  federal 
e  of suc- 
ch  I  have 
that  dur- 
,vn  to  the 
unexam- 
lis  period 
ts  of  com' 
her^  that 
illigerent 
!  of  1 794, 
VI  r  Jay's 
[inity  was 

in  Octo- 
od  of  her 
d  at  not 
Sior  have 
pbliationii 
mxe. ' 
pxtended, 
:ontinued 
same  un- 
id  to  the 
onimerce 
embargo. 
:al  cause, 
cau^e  has 
iistify  this 

and  then 
s  or  just, 
ht  by  the 
the  secre- 
;ht  by  her 
'  should  be 
er  of  the 
ugh  afteu- 


wftrds  publicly  and  stoutly  denied,  they  were  believed  ;  and  no  gen- 
tleman here  will  now  be  inclined  to  doubt  the  fact.  These  reports, 
and  the  mystery  which  surrounded  the  recommendedenibargo,  na- 
turally excited  suspicions  and  alarms. 

Of  the  French  papers  supposed  to  be  brought  by  the  Revenge, 
none  were  communicated  to  (  ongress,  save  a  letter  dried  Septem- 
ber 24,  1807,  from  General  Armstrong  to  M.  Champagny,  and  his 
answer  of  the  Tth  of  October,  relative  to  the  Berlin  decree,  and  a 
letter  from  Regnier,  minister  of  justice,  to  Champagny,  giving  the 
emperor's  interpretation  of  that  decree.  These  three  papers,  with 
a  newspaper  copy  of  a  proclamation  of  the  king  of  Great  Britain, 
issued  in  the  same  October,  were  all  the  papers  communicated  by 
the  president  to  congress,  as  the  grounds  on  which  he  recommend- 
ed the  embargo.  These  /lafitrs,  he  said  "  shewed  the  grmi  and 
increasing  dangers  with  which  our  vessels,  our  seamen  and  mer- 
chandise were  "threatened  on  the  high  seas  and  elsewhere,  from  the 
belligerent  powers  of  Europe."  .  . 

As  to  the  proclamation  of  the  king  of  Great  Britain,  requiring 
the  return  of  his  subjects,  and  particularly  the  seamen,  from  foreign 
countries,  it  was  no  more  than  every  government  has  a  nght  to 
issue,  and  commonly  does  issue,  in  time  of  war.  This  proclama- 
tion contained  no  evidence  of  increasing  danger  to  "  our  seamen ;" 
'  on  the  contrary,  if  i  mistake  not  (for  I  have  not  the  proclamation 
by  me)  there  was  a  solemn,  public  injunction  to  his  naval  officers  to 
conduct  impressments  with  increased  caution  and  care.  So  that 
impressments  would  probably  rather  be  dimirished  than  increased. 
Let  us  now  examine  the  three  other  papers,  all  of  which,  as  1  have 
noticed,  and  as  gentlemen  i-emember,  related  to  the  decree  of  No- 
vember 2 1 ,  1 806.  This  decree  was  issued  at  Berlin,  by  the  French 
emperor,  at  the  moment  when,  inflated  with  more  than  ordinary  ar- 
rogance and  pride,  he  was  sitting  in  that  capital  of  the  Prussian 
monarchy,  just  then  subverted  by  his  arms. 

The  first  article  declared  all  the  British  Isles  in  a  state  of  block- 
ade. This,  according  to  its  terms,  subjected  to  capture  and  con- 
demnation a';  -eutral  vessels  bound  to  and  from  British  ports:  but 
it  seems  to  have  been  held  in  a  state  of  suspence.  But  another  ar- 
ticle, declaring  "  all  merchandise  belonging  to  England,  or  coming 
from  its  manufactories  and  colonics  (although  belonging  to  neu- 
trals) to  be  lawful  prize,"  was  to  be  carried  uito  execution.  Such 
was  the  decision  of  the  emperor  as  stated  by  his  minister  of  jus- 
tice on  the  18th  of  September,  1807,  in  his  letter  to  Champagny. 
This  decision  coming  to  the  knowledge  of  general  Armstrong,  he, 
on  the  24th  of  September,  wrote  to  Mr.  Champagny,  and  asked 
"  whether  it  was  the  emperor's  intention  to  infract  the  obligations 
of  the  treaty  subsisting  between  the  United  States  and  the  French 
empire."  Mr.  Champagny  in  his  answer  of  the  7th  of  October, 
inclosing  the  letter  of  the  minister  of  justice,  with  wonderful  assur- 

,    v^  1    « i ^,-    *u«*  '.f  uToe  nQcir  in  rprnnrile  the  e.x- 

ance,  tens  genera:  y*ri::suun|^,  wi^n.  --  ,t,„^ -....■.;  —  .„_.     .      ^ 

ecution  of  the  decree  with  the  observance  of  treaties  I  although 
iiothing  was  more  obvious,  (as  Mr.  Madison  on  the  8th  of  February 


16 

last,  wrote  to  general  Armstrong)  than  that  it  violated  as  well  the 
positive  stipulations  of  our  treaty  with  France,  as  the  incontestable 
principles  of  public  law. 

Id  the  European  ^jorts,  under  the  emperor's  controul,  and  even 
in  neutral  ports,  the  decree  was  ric^orously  executed.  AtkI  although 
it  is  said  there  was  no  formal  decision  in  the  French  council  of  prizes, 
condemninj;  American  property,  under  the  decree,  till  the  1 6th  of 
October,  1807 ;  yet  Mr.  Madison  states,  as  early  as  the  22d  of  May, 
180r,  [in  his  letter  of  that  date  to  general  Armstrong]  that  "  there 
were  proofs  that  tne  French  West  India  privateers  had,  u/id-r  colour 
of  the  edict  [the  Berlin  decree.]  coinniiited  depredations"  on  our 
commerce.  And  moreover,  that  Spain  '^  avowedly  pursuing  the  ex- 
ample and  the  views  of  the  French  emperor,"  had  issued  a  similar 
decree,  and  even  in  broader  terms,  which,  "  if  not  speedily  recalled 
or  corrected,  would  doubtless  extend  the  scene  of  spoliations 
already  begun  in  that  quarter." 

Such  were  the  French  papers  in  this  case.  And  now  let  us  see 
the  amount  of"  the  great  and  increasing  dangers  which  threat- 
ened our  vessels,  our  seamen  and  iperchandisc." 

In  the  letter  of  February  8,  18*8,  from  Mr.  Madison  to  general 
Armstrong,  speaking  of  the  Berlin  decree,  and  the  emi>eror's  de- 
cision thereon,  Mr.  Madison  says,  "  The  conduct  of  the  French 
government,  in  giving  this  extended  operation  to  its  decree,  and 
indeed  in  issuing  one  with  such  an  apparent  or  doubtful  import, 
against  the  rights  of  the  sea,  is  the  more  extraordinary,  inasmuch 
as  the  inability  to  enforce  it  on  that  element,  exhibited  the  measure 
in  the  light  of  an  "  empty  menace  .'"  And  in  his  letter  of  the  25th 
of  March,  l$08,  toMr.  Erskine,  Mr.  Madison,  speaking  of  the 
same  decree,  says,  that  France  was  without  tht  vuana  to  carry  it 
into  effect  against  the  rights  and  obligations  of  a  yu-utral  nation. 

Thus  then  we  see  the  president's  ''  great  and  increasing  dangers 
with  which  our  vessels,  our  seamen  and  merchandise  were  threat- 
ened on  the  high  seas  and  elsewhere,  "from  the  French  decree  and 
its  extended  operation,  rested  on  what  he,  through  his  secretary 
Mr.  Madison,  has  since  pronounced  "  an  empty  menace,"  a  pro- 
ject "  which  France  had  not  the  means  to  carry  into  effect !" 

Shall  I  be  told,  Mr.  president,  of  the  British  orders  of  council? 
and  that  they  were  comprehended  in  the  president's  view  of  the 
great  and  increasing  dangers  to  which  our  commerce  was  exposed  ? 
If  that  were  the  fact,  was  it  not  his  duty  to  give  such  information 
of  them  as  he  possessed,  to  the  nate  i  He  gave  none.  I  know 
that  those  orders.were  afterwarda  pressed  into  his  service  to  justify 
the  measure  :  and  still  later  it  has  been  confidently  said  '» that 
those, orders  stood  in  front  of  the  real  causes  of  the  embargo:" 
And  yet  they  v/ere  invisible  to  the  senaie.  What !  the  great.,  the 
o/icrative  cause  of  the  embargo,  "  before  which  all  other  motives 
sunk  into  insignificance,"  not  sj^en,  not  known  to  the  senate  ?  Nor. 
glanced  at  by  the  president  in  his  message,  nor  intimated  to  any  of 
the  members  who  were  honored  with  his  confidence,  and  by  them 
to  the  senate  ?   -  •      ' 


1'7 


13  well  the 
ontestable 

and  even 

1  although 
I  ol  prizes, 
he  1 6th  of 
d  of  May, 
lat  "  there 
id't'  coLjur 
s"  on  our 
ng  the  ex- 
1  a  similar 
y  recalled 
poliations 

let  us  see 
ch  threat- 

to  general 
eror's  de- 
le  French 
:cree,  and 
il  import, 
inasmuch 
i  measure 
f  the  25th 
ng  of  the 
;o  carry  it- 
ion. 

§•  dangers 
:re  threat- 
ecree  and 
secretary 
:,"  a  pro- 

• 

f  council  ? 
e\v  of  the 

exposed  ? 

formation 

I  know 

to  justify 
iid  '» that 
iibargo  :'* 
g-rfo/,  the 
r  motives 
ate  ?  Not. 
I  to  any  of 
\  by  them 


But  from  reasoning  I  will  recur  to  written  proofs,  furnished  by 
the  president  himself,  and  now  on  our  tables. 

In  Mr  Madison's  letter  to  Mr.  Pmkney,  the  president  s  mmis- 
tcr  in  London,  dated  December  23,  1807,  the  next  day  after  the 
act  lavinK  an   embargo  was  passed  ;  and  this  after  it  had  under- 
gone three  days  of  earnest  opposition  in  the  house  of  representa- 
lives    during  which  it  behoved  the  father  of  the  measure,  and  his 
friends,  to  furnish  every  possible  argument  to  silence  opposition, 
and  to  satisfy  the  nation  of  its  expediency  and  necessity. ...after  all 
this,  Mr  Madison,  in  that  letter,  tells  Mr.  Pinkney,  that  «  the/.o- 
/rev  and  the  causes  of  the  measure  are  explained  in  the  message 
itself  "     The  contents  of  the  message  (comprehendmg  the  papers 
it  referred  to)  I  have  already  stated  :  and  the  statement  demon* 
strates,  that  they  were  not  the  causes  or  motives  of  the  embargo  : 
for  an  "  empty  menace,"   a  decree  vMhont  the  weans  of  carrying  it 
into  effects  could  be  no  cause,  no  motive  for  a  measure,  whose  av^v. 
ed  object  was  «  to  save  our  vessels,  our  seamen,  and  merchandise 

from  GREAT  and  INCREASIKG    DANGERS."  -j      ^  ,  ^ 

Sir,  let  all  the  documents  laid  on  our  tables  by  the  president  be 
examined,  and  you  will  not  find  ontj  in  which  he  hazards  the  asser- 
tion,  that  the  British  orders  of  November  1 1th  were  known  to  him 
at  the  time  he  recommended  the  embargo,  or  that  an  expectation  o 
them  determined  his  recommendation.     It  was  not  until  the  2d  ot 
February,  when  they  had  been  officially  communicated  by  the  Bri- 
tish minister,  that  he  offered  them  to  congress  *;  as  a  farther  proof 
of  the  increasing  dangers  to  our  navigation  and  conimerce,  which 
led  to  the  provident  measure  of  the  act  laying  an  embargo.       And 
Mr.  Madison,  in  his  letter  to  Mr.  Pinkney,  of  February  19,  1808, 
cautiously  avoids  ascribing  the  origin  of  the  embargo  to  the  British 
^•ders  ;    though,  he   says,  the  probability  ot  such  decrees  was 
among  the  considerations  which  "  enforced"   the  measure  ;   the 
language  of  the  British  gazettes,  with  other  indications,  having 
(he  said)  left  little  doubt  that  such  orders  were  "  meditated.       And 
he  adds,  that  "the  appearance  of  these  decrees  (meamng  the  Bri- 
tish orders)  had  much  efiect  in  reconciling  all  descriptions  amonr> 

us  to  the  embargo."  .     ,r     -i»   ,•       »    i„„+ 

But  I  must  notice  the  change  of  languag.  m  Mr.  Madison's  last 
letter  In  that  of  December  23d  to  Mr.  Pinkney,  he  says, '  the 
policy  and  the  causes  of  the  embargo  are  explained  m  the  President  s 
message."  But  in  his  letter  of  February  19th,  he  says, «  my  last 
(that  of  December  23d)  inclosed  a  copy  of  the  act  of  embargo,  and 
explained  the  fioUcy  of  the  measure  ;"  leaving  out"  causes,  and 
introducing  the  unknoivn  British  orders  as  among  the  considerations 

which  enforced  it.  _  .  .      r 

The  president,  loo,  in  his  answer  to  the  Boston  petition  for  sus- 
pending  the  embargo,  says,«or  that  the  Britisj.  o^'^/^Jff^^^X 
V.exishl  the  time  when  the  embargo  was  laid  ;  but  only  that  ///  y 

.  .     ^.L_  j_* f  »v.a  1.1W  '    frnm    which   thc   unwai'V 

reader  might  suppose  that  they  were  knotm  to  exist  at  that  date. 

From  all  these  considerations,  it  appears  to  be  demonstrated, 
that  thc  British  orders  in  council  of  November  llth,  1807,  were 

3 


18 


II 


not  known,  and  that  the  uewapaper  rumors  coucernrng  them  ucvu 
entered  into  the  views  of  the  president  and  congress,  as  a  motive 
ior  laying  the  embargo.  And  here  the  well  known  maxim  applies, 
oc  non  afi/iarcntibm  et  non  exmendbm  cadevi  eat  lex.  Althouj^h  the 
British  orders  were  in  existence,  yet  as  they  were  not  knovjti  to  exiat^ 
ihey  Were,  as  to  the  embarj^o,  non-entities. 

Theconclusionft  resulting frtim  the  facts  and  circumstances  which 
J  have  collected  and  compared,  are  serious  and  alarming.  They 
demonstrate,  that  the  representation,  in  the  president's  message  re- 
'•ommending  the  embargo,  Was  delusive,  calculated  to  lead  congresi^ 
mtothe  behet  that  the  situation  of  the  United  States,  in  relation  to 
trance  und  England,  was  extremely  perilous,  requiring  the  instant 
adoption  of  the  measure  recommc-ulcd.  And  as  congress  did  adopt 
It,  enactmg  the  law  recommended,  it  must  be  presumed  that  they 
believed  an  embargo  Was  necessary  to  preserve  our  vessels,  our  sea- 
men and  merchandise,  from  great  and  increasing  dangers,  with  which 
the  message  stated  that  they  were  threatened. 

It  also  follows,  as  no  subsequent  disclosure  has  been  made  of 
other  dangers  knowh  at  the  time  the  message  was  .communicated, 
that  the  real  cause  or  motive  for  the  embargo  has  been^  and  yet  is^ 
veiled  fro  >i  the  eye  of  Congress  and  the  nation. 

M.  Champagny's  letter  of  October  7,  (one  of  the  papers  com- 
municated  with  the  president's  message)  requifes  examination, 
liut  I  should  hrst  remark,  that  during  the  years  1806,  and  180r» 
m  order  to  reduce  England,  by  destroying  her  commerce^  the  French 
oniperor,  m  execution  of,  and  in  the  spirit  of  his  Berlin  decree, 
ordered  all  English  merchandise  to  be  seized  and  confiscated,  in 
every  place  on  the  European  continent,  enemy  or  neutral,  occu- 
pied or  which  should  be  occupied  by  the  Ei-ench  armies.     For  this 
imrpose,  and  as  one  instance  among  many,  his  troops  took  posses- 
sion  ofthecity  of  Hamburg  (a  city  with  which  American  merchants 
carried  on  a  large  and  valuable  commerce,  and  which  as  neutral 
was  entitled  to  the  same  exemption  from  hostile  violence  as  the 
ferntory  of  the  United  States)  and  by  the  emperor's  orders,  Bour- 
iienne,  his  accrecWted  minister  to  that  free  city,  addressed  a  note  to 
Its  senate,  in  Avhich,  having  stated  that  every  person  who  traded  on 
the  cdntinent  in  English  merchandise,  seconded  the  views  of  En- 
gland, and  ought  to  be  considered  as  her  accomplice  ;  and  that  a 
great  portion  of  the  inhabitants  of  Hamburgh  were  in  that  predica- 
ment, and  notoriously  attached  to  England  ;  the  emperor  caused 
possession  to  be  taken  of  their  city,  and  his  Berlin  decree  to  be  car- 
ried mto  rigorous  execution.     Accordingly,  that  minister,  in  obedi- 
ence  to  the  emperor's  orders,  among  other  outrages,  declared,  "All 
English  merchandises  that  may  be  found  in  the  city,  in  the  harbour, 
or  on  the  territory  of  Hamburg,  no  7natter  to  'mhom  they  belong,  shall 
be  confiscated.'*     This  was  done  so  early  as  the  24th  of  November, 
]  806,  on^y  three  days  after  the  Berlin  decree  was  issued. 

With  equal  atrocity  the  emperor  caused  to  be  seized  and  seques- 
tered the  vessels  and  cargoes  of  neutrals  which  were  brought  into, 
or  voluntarily  resorted  to  the  ports  of  France  for  purpose^  of  lawful 
trade.    And  we  know  from  a  source  which  will  not  be  questioned, 


11) 


ig  tbcuvucvti 
is,  as  a  motive 
laxim  appJies, 
Althoiij^h  the 
inoivn  to  ejiistf 

stances  which 
Tiing.  They 
's  message  re- 
Icad  congres-s 
in  relation  to 
ng  the  instant 
ress  did  adopt 
ned  that  they 
ssels,  our  sea- 
rs, with  which 

een  made  of 
iminimicated, 
'«)  and  yd  is^ 

papers  corn- 
examination. 
•6,  and  1807, 
•,  the  French 
eriin  decree, 
>nfiscated,  in 
eutral,  occu- 
28.     For  this 
took  posses, 
in  mercJiants 
2h  as  neutral 
)Ience  as  the 
irders,  Bour- 
sed  a  note  to 
ho  traded  ou 
iews  of  En- 
;  and  that  a 
hat  predica- 
>eror  caused 
ee  to  be  car- 
er, in  obedi- 
clared,  "All 
the  harbour, 
belongs  shall 
November, 
d. 

and  seques- 
rought  into, 
ie§  of  lawful 
questione,d, 


tliMt  their  liijcration  was  hopeless  ;  because  they  w,.rc  u<orcli  cightrc^i 
or  trjinty  imUionn  (if'doUam. 

Of  the  vast  property  thus  plundered,  a  large  portion  belongs  to 
citizens  of  the  United  States.     On  the    LHh  of  January  last,  the 
emperor's  minister  Champagny,  wrote  to  our  muuster,  general 
\rmstvong,  that  their  properly  would  ren)ain  Requcstercd  until  a 
decision  should  be  hud  thereon  5  and  this  decision  depended  m  our 
aoaociathiir  or  nfimv'r  to  aanociatc  onrntivc-s  ivilh  hivi  and  /ns  allied 
states  in  their  irar  with  Great  Britain.     Indeed  the  emperor  was 
willinc  to  save  us  the  trouble  of  considering  and  deciding  for  our- 
selves •  he  declared  war  for  us.  "  War  exists  then  in  fact  between 
'- neland  and  the  United  States,"  are  the  words  of  Champagny,  m 
the  letter  iiist  mentioned  I     \\hat  measures  ought  to  be  kept  with 
such  a  Power  ?  While  we  are  yet  independent,  he  undertakes  to 
prescribe  the  line  of  conduct  we  shall  observe,  on  pain  of  confisca- 
tion of  all  the  property  of  our  innocent  and  unsuspecting  merchants 
within  his  grasp  I     And  this  monstrous  outrage  upon  our  honour 
and  independence,  the   secretary  of  state,  with   vej-y  exemplary 
meeknes*,  says,  "  had  the  air,  at  least,  of  an  assumed  authority  I 

W- here  I  =s  armies  did  not  thus  penetrate  and  plunder,  the  Irench 
emperor  sent  to  the  several  powers  on  the  continent,  whether  em- 
perors, kings,  or  petty  states,  requiring  {ov  which  from  him  was 
OGuivalent  to  a  command,  inviungj  them  to  shut  thnr  jwrts  agaimt 
the  commerce  of  England:  and,  Sweden  excepted  (between  whoin 
and  the  French  armies  lay  a  narrow  sea  guarded  by  Swedish  and 
British  ships)  all  obeyed.  Even  the  emperor  of  Austria,  though 
ut  peace  with  England,  shut  against  her  his  two  or  three  little  ports 
at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic  sea. 

The  pvince  regent  of  Portugal,  whose  country  for  more  than  a 
century  had  lived  in  friendship  with  England,  was  the  last  to  obey. 
But  though  he  shut  his  ports,  national  faith  and  gratitude  towards 
his  friends,  forbade  his  arresting  Englishmen  and  English  mer- 
chandise, liv  shutting  his  ports,  he  hoped  to  appease  the  emperor, 
and  save  his  kingdom.  But  his  fate  had  been  determined :  although 
Portugal  had  for  many  years  been  paying  a  heavy  tribute  to  trance, 
ind  been,  moreover,  anxious  to  observe  the  duties  of  a  neutral  nation. 
To  save  himself  and  family  from  disgrace  and  bondage,  the  prince 
quitted  his  kingdom :  finding  an  asylum  in  his  American  domi- 

Thus  we  have  s  the  French  emperor  not  only  shutting  his 
own  poits  and  those  of  his  allies,  but  even  those  of  neutral  states, 
against  British  commerce;  and  seizing  and  confiscating  the  mer- 
chandise proceeding  from  England  and  her  colonies,  although  be- 
longing  to  neutrals,  and  on  neutral  territories  ;  and  that  this  unex- 
ampled scene  of  devastation  commenced  within  four  days  after  the 
Berlin  decree  was  issued.  _  ^ 

It  was  after  she  had  witnessed  all  these  atrocities,  and  seen  the 
deadly  weapon  aimed  at  her  vitals,  that  England  issued  her  retail 
ating  orders  of  November  1  Ith,  1807. 


.  * 


Mr,  Madison's  letter  of  May  ad,  1808,  to  general  Armstrong:: 


20 


1  now  recur  to  Mr.  Chanipagny's  letter  of  October  f,  to  gwjeri! 
Armstrong,  in  answer  to  his  inquiry,  "  whether  (in  executing 
the  Berlin  decree)  it  was  his  majesty's  intention  to  infract  the  obli- 
gations of  the  treaty  now  subsisting  between  the  United  States  and 
the  French  empire?"  The  answer  to  which  has  been  already 
recited. 

Allow  rac  to  repeat,  that  this  letter  of  Champagny  was  one   of 
the  four  jiapers  communicated  by"  the  president  with  his  message 
recommending  the  embargo,  and  one  of  the  two  which,  after  being 
read,  was  not  then  suflered  to  remain  on  the  files  of  the  senate,  but 
was  returned  to  the  president,  together  with  general  Armstrong's 
letter  to  which  it  was  an  answer,  agreeably  to  his  request.     Subse- 
quent events  drew  it  from  the  cabinet.     Gentlemen  will  also  recol- 
lect, that  the  concluding  paragraph  of  the  president's  message,  in 
trhich  he  desired  a  return  of  those  two  letters,  was  erdered  by  the 
senate  to  be  omitted ;  so  that  no  evidence  of  the  existence  of  those 
letters  could  appear  on  the  senate's  journal,  or  in  the  printed  copy. 
In  this  letter  of  Champagny,  the  views  of  the  French  emperor  were 
but  two  clearly  indicated.  To  render  his  degree  of  blockade  '*  more 
effectual"  (that  is  in  destroying  the  commerce  of  England)  "  its 
execution  must  be  complete."      But  as  it  could  not  be  complete 
while  the  vessels  of  the  United  States  (then  with  those  of  England 
carrying  on,  almost  exclusively,  the  commerce  of  the  world)  con- 
tinued their  extensive  trade  with  England ;    we  were,  in  language 
sufficiently  intelligible,  invited  to  fall  into  the  imperial  ranks,  with 
the  maritime  powers  of  Europe,  whom  the  French  emperor  had 
marshalled  against  England,  and  "  to  unite  in  support  of  the  same 
cause;"  that  is,  to  destroy  the  commerce  of  England.      But  the 
people  of  the  United  States  would  have  been  shocked  at  an  open 
proposition  to  shut  their  ports  against  the  English  commerce,  at 
the  command,  or  invitation   of  the  French  emperor;  they  wouW 
hot  have  endured  it.     The  measure  could  be  accomplished  only  by 
an  EMBAKGo,  and  that  wrapped  up  in  the  mystery  which  I  have 
endeavoured  to  unfold. 

•  This  letter  of  Champagny  must  have  arrived  in  the  Revenge  ; 
and  general  Armstrong's  dispatches  by  her,  reached  Washington, 
as  Mr.  Madison  informs  us,  on  the  14th  of  December  ;  and  oj.  the 
18th  the  embai-go  was  proposed  and  recommended  !  Four  days 
gave  little  enough  time  to  digest  and  mature  such  \  plan  ! 

These,  sir,  are  my  views  of  the  origin  of  the  embargo  ;  tlie  re- 
sult of  a  careful,  and  I  trust,  an  impartial  investigation.  The  ma- 
terial facts  are  on  record.  Of  my  reasonings  and  conclusions  gen- 
tlemen win  judge.  If  these  be  correct,  the  course  to  be  pursued 
must  he  obvious.  The  nation's  honour  is  compatible  with  the  repeal 
of  the  embargo.  The  welfare  of  our  country  is  not  to  be  sacrificed 
to  the  views  or  feelings  of  those  yfho  have  brought  it  into  its  pre- 
ncnt  situation. 

Let  then,  the  resolution  before  us  be  adopted,  and  the  embargo 
removed.  As  the  British  orders  in  council  were  not  the  catiae  of 
the  embargo,  the  /ionour  of  the  United  States  is  not  pledged  for 
the\r  fir evious  repeat.  '  '. 


i 

i 

t 


f ,  to  geuera! 
in  executing 
ract  the  obli- 
i<.\  States  and 
ecn    already 

was  one  of 
his  message 
1,  after  being 
e  senate,  but 
Armstrong's 
est.  Subse- 
11  also  recol- 
niessage,  in 
dered  by  the 
:nce  of  those 
►rinted  copy, 
mperor  were 
kade  '*  more 
igland)  "its 
l>e  complete 
:  of  England 
world)  con- 
in  language 
ranks,  with 
imperor  had 
of  the  same 
I.  fiut  the 
at  an  open 
smmerce,  at 
they  woulil 
ihed  only  by 
liich  I  have 

e  Revenge  ; 

Vashington, 
and  oi>  the 
Four  days 

.AN  ! 

go  ;  tlie  re- 
.  The  ma- 
usions  gen- 
be  pursued 
h  the  repeal 
te  sacrificed 
nto  its  pre- 

he  embargo 
the  cause  of 
pledged  for 


